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Abstract
We unify the Bayesian and Frequentist justifications for model se-
lection based upon maximizing the evidence, using a precise definition
of model complexity which we call ‘flexibility’. In the Gaussian linear
model, flexibility is asymptotically equal to the Bayesian Information
Criterion (BIC) penalty. But we argue against replacing flexibility
with the BIC penalty. Instead, we advocate estimating the evidence
directly, for which there now exists a wide range of approaches in the
literature.
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1 Introduction
As Albert Einstein almost said, “Scientific models should be as simple as
possible, but no simpler”. Ockham’s razor is a common term for this principle
of simplicity. Sober (2015) contains a wide-ranging review, including what
Einstein actually said.
In Statistics and Machine Learning, Ockham’s razor leads us to favour
less complex models where we can. But why this should be, and what we
mean by ‘complex’, are subtle issues. In this paper, we describe one approach
to implementing Ockham’s razor for model selection, based on a decomposi-
tion of the ‘evidence’ into a ‘fit’ term and a complexity term which we call
‘flexibility’. Our decomposition is exact for all models and all regularizers.
Effectively, we complete the strand of research initiated by David MacKay
(MacKay, 1992, 2003), and followed up by many others since then. Our anal-
ysis is simple enough to warrant inclusion in every practitioner’s toolbox.
Section 2 provides the background, including a discussion of the role of
the evidence in model selection. Section 3 presents our exact decomposition
of evidence into ‘fit plus flexibility’, and we justify flexibility as a measure of
model complexity. Section 4 illustrates, using the Gaussian linear model for
which simple closed-form expressions are available. The Bayesian Informa-
tion Criterion (BIC) penalty is shown to be an approximation to flexibility
in this case, but we caution against its use in model selection in general,
and even specifically in those cases where the BIC penalty and flexibility are
asymptotically equal. Section 5 concludes with a summary.
2 Background
Our starting-point is a set of observations yobs. A statistical model is pro-
posed,
f(y; θ),
y ∈ Y ⊂ Rnθ ∈ Θ ⊂ Rd. (1)
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The defining features of such a model are
∀θ ∈ Θ : f(·; θ) ≥ 0,
∫
Rn
f(y; θ) dy = 1, (2)
where the integral may be replaced by a sum if Y is countable. This model is
augmented with a regularizer R : Θ→ R. The fitted value of the parameter
is
θˆ := argmax
θ∈Θ
log f(yobs; θ)−R(θ). (3)
Thus the regularizer is functionally equivalent to a prior distribution
pi(θ) ∝ e−R(θ), (4)
which we assume is proper, and in this case the fitted value θˆ is identical to
the Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) estimate of θ.
As this outline makes clear, the estimated value θˆ is a function of both the
statistical model and the regularizer. To be precise, we would write ‘model
and regularizer’ everywhere below, but this would be tedious; therefore we
will write ‘model’, but in every case where we write ‘model’ we mean ‘model
and regularizer’.
Define the ‘evidence’ of this model as
E :=
∫
Θ
f(yobs; θ) pi(θ) dθ. (5)
This value E is a function of the model and the observations, but in a
Bayesian approach it has the additional interpretation of ‘marginal likeli-
hood’: the probability density function of the observables Y evaluated at
the observations yobs. The normalizing constant in the prior distribution (4)
is not required to compute θˆ, but it is required to compute the evidence
directly. Friel and Wyse (2012) provide a review of methods for estimating
the evidence, covering a literature which stretches back thirty years.
Suppose, perhaps for pragmatic reasons, that we would like to select a
single model from a set of models under consideration, indexed by M. For
example, M might represent a set of Gaussian linear models with different
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model matrices (see Section 4). The basic claim is that maximizing the
evidence is a good way to select such a model. That is, if Ei is the evidence
of model i, then
i∗ := argmax
i∈M
Ei (6)
is the best single model in M. This claim has two justifications.
The first justification is Bayesian. The Bayesian approach to inference
with multiple models has a long and rich literature; see, e.g., Bernardo and
Smith (1994, ch. 6), O’Hagan and Forster (2004, ch. 7), Robert (2007, ch. 7),
or Gelman et al. (2014, ch. 7) for the theory, and Hastie and Green (2012) for
computation. Here we narrate only a ‘bare bones’ approach. Suppose that
we equip the models inM with prior probabilities, wi ≥ 0; then the posterior
probabilities are proportional to wiEi. If the evidence is highly concentrated
relative to the prior probabilities, then i∗ is very likely to be the MAP model
(certain, if wi ∝ 1, but this flat prior on models can be problematic). If
we can use only one model, then the MAP model is a reasonable candidate.
This leads us to select model i∗.
Clearly, this Bayesian justification is highly contingent: on our willingness
to provide prior probabilities for the models in M, on the concentration of
the evidence relative to the prior probabilities, and on the suitability of the
MAP model as the best single choice. Concerning this last point, it is easy to
imagine a situation where the MAP model is isolated in ‘model-space’, but
where there is a cluster of models elsewhere in model-space, for which the
cluster collectively has higher posterior probability than the MAP model. A
model from the centre of the cluster might well be preferred to the MAP
model. All in all, the Bayesian argument for selecting i∗ as the single ‘best’
model is suggestive but not compelling.
The second justification is Frequentist, because it claims that i∗ is a
model-selection algorithm with good properties. It is universally recognized
that selecting entirely on the basis of fit is detrimental to good out-of-sample
predictive performance, and that good selection algorithms ought to penalize
fit with some measure of ‘model complexity’, as summarized by the following
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schematic:
Simple model
poor fit
poor prediction
//
Complex model
excellent fit
poor prediction
Best single model
good fit
good prediction
OO
The first author to derive an explicit simple complexity penalty was Akaike
(1973), and there have been many proposals since: this is still an active field
of research in Statistics and Machine Learning (see, e.g., Gelman et al., 2014,
ch. 7).
David MacKay (MacKay, 1992, 2003) argued that the evidence itself con-
tains a complexity penalty. He termed this penalty the Ockham factor (al-
though he spelled it ‘Occam’; we are following the spelling in Sober, 2015).
MacKay’s argument had two strands. First, there was ‘proof by picture’, a
compelling illustration that the evidence will sometimes select less complex
models over more complex models, shown here as Figure 1.
But the second strand is less compelling. MacKay applied a first-order
Laplace approximation to the posterior distribution, and showed that, under
this approximation,
logE ≈ log f(yobs; θˆ)− penalty, (7)
where ‘penalty’ has an explicit form in terms of the model and the observa-
tions, but its form is not important to our argument. We know, as a matter of
logic, that ‘penalty’ must behave something like a model complexity penalty.
This follows because the first term on the righthand side will tend to be
larger for more complex models, and hence if the evidence can sometimes be
smaller for more complex models, as Figure 1 demonstrates, then ‘penalty’
must sometimes be larger for more complex models.
However, the first-order Laplace approximation to the posterior distribu-
tion is dubious. It was dubious in 1992, as evidenced by the fact that statis-
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Figure 1: Similar to MacKay (2003), Figure 28.3 (p. 344). The more complex
Model 1 spreads its probability over a wider set of values in the data-space Y ,
and hence the evidence will favour the less complex Model 2 in some regions
of Y . In this case the evidence favours the more complex model at yobs = y′,
and the less complex model at yobs = y′′.
ticians at that time were working hard to develop MCMC methods, which
would hardly have been necessary had the Laplace approximation been ef-
fective (see, e.g., Andrieu et al., 2003, for some history). It is even more
dubious today, in our era of massively over-parameterized models and exotic
regularizers. Therefore it is gratifying that we can show that there is an ex-
act equality between evidence, fit, and a complexity penalty, which holds in
complete generality, and where the penalty has a simple and intuititve form.
3 ‘Flexibility’
Our approach uses a simple but insightful result that is simply a reformula-
tion of Bayes’s Theorem:
E =
f(yobs; θ0) pi(θ0)
pi∗(θ0)
(8)
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for all θ0 ∈ Θ for which pi∗(θ0) > 0, where pi∗ is the posterior distribution.
Chib (1995, p. 1314) refers to this equality as the basic marginal likelihood
identity (BMI); it also goes by the name Candidate’s formula, after Besag
(1989).
If we set θ0 = θˆ from (3), then we immediately deduce
logE = log f(yobs; θˆ)− log pi
∗(θˆ)
pi(θˆ)
(9)
from (8). By our argument at the end of the previous section, the second
term on the righthand side must behave something like a model complexity
penalty. To identify it explicitly, we give it the name
flexibility := log
pi∗(θˆ)
pi(θˆ)
. (10a)
We have, under this definition,
logE = log f(yobs, θˆ)− flexibility, (10b)
an exact decomposition of the evidence, which holds for all models. This
is the unique decomposition for which the ‘fit’ term is log f(yobs; θˆ). A dif-
ferent estimate for θ, such as the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM)
estimate, would give a different penalty term in the decomposition of the
evidence. However, given that the regularizer is functionally equivalent to a
prior distribution, the penalized likelihood (or MAP) estimate θˆ seems the
most natural value to use for θ0.
We contend that flexibility is a reasonable way to measure model com-
plexity. A model will be ‘flexible’ if it contains a large number of degrees
of freedom (e.g. represented by dim Θ, which might be the number of basis
functions), and if its coefficients are unconstrained in the regularizer (or prior
distribution). A model will be ‘inflexible’ either if it contains few degrees of
freedom, or if its coefficients are constrained, or both. A flexible model will
often be able to concentrate its posterior probability into a small region of
the parameter space, relative to the prior probability, and hence its flexibil-
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ity penalty will be high. An inflexible model will often struggle to move its
posterior probability away from its prior probability, and hence its flexibility
penalty will be low. Complex models will typically be flexible, in this sense,
and simple models will be inflexible.
Defining model complexity as flexibility unifies the Bayesian and Frequen-
tist justifications for selecting a single model by maximizing the evidence. In
other words, the MAP model selected using a Bayesian approach with a
flat (or flattish) prior on models is the same as the model selected using a
Frequentist approach in which the fit is penalized using flexibility as the com-
plexity penalty. Because the evidence already contains a complexity penalty,
it would be a strange decision to add a complexity penalty to the evidence for
the purposes of model selection, unless it was quite clear that the flexibility
penalty was deficient in some way.
The next Section considers the case where the flexibility has a closed-form
expression, and a simple asymptotic approximation.
4 Illustration: Gaussian linear model
Consider the Gaussian linear model with model-matrix G ∈ Rn×d and obser-
vation error variance σ2. Using a quadratic regularizer parameterized by λ,
R(θ) = 1
2
λ2‖θ‖2 (11a)
pi(θ) = N (0d, P−1) (11b)
pi∗(θ) = N (θˆ, (P ∗)−1) (11c)
where P := λ2Id is the prior precision, and P
∗ is the posterior precision,
P ∗ =
1
σ2
GTG+ P (11d)
θˆ =
1
σ2
(P ∗)−1GTyobs; (11e)
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these are both functions of (σ, λ), which we treat as known (but see below).
Hence
flexibility =
1
2
log
(
detP ∗
detP
)
+
λ2
2
‖θˆ‖2. (12)
This is the exact result. In the limit as λ → ∞, P ∗P−1 = I and that =
O(1/λ2); thus flexibility = O(1/λ2), confirming that, asymptotically, flexi-
bility decreases to zero as the penalty on the quadratic regularizer increases,
although λ might have to be huge to overwhelm the GTG term in P ∗.
Now consider the effect of n→∞ when d is fixed. Under IID sampling,
n−1GTG P−−−−→ H (13a)
θˆ
P−−−−→ m (13b)
where H and m are both constants. Substituting into (12) and rearranging,
flexibility−d log n
2
P−−−−→ 1
2
{
−d(log σ2+log λ2)+log detH+λ2 ‖m‖2
}
. (14)
The second term on the lefthand side is the Bayesian Information Criterion
(BIC) penalty, and the term on the righthand side is Op(1). Thus, for the
Gaussian linear model and IID sampling,
flexibility = BIC penalty + Op(1), d fixed, n→∞. (15)
For sufficiently large n, flexibility ≈ BIC penalty does seem to be justifiable,
for choosing between models with different model matrices, and thus different
d’s. This large-n calculation is also applicable when the model gives rise to
an approximately Gaussian posterior distribution.
However, we advise caution. First, as already noted, we cannot presume
an approximately Gaussian posterior distribution in modern practice, and
therefore ‘flexibility ≈ BIC penalty’ is a poor generic approximation. Sec-
ond, it is not safe to drop O(1) terms in model comparison (Gelfand and
Dey, 1994), as we will discuss further below. Put simply, if flexibility is the
right way to penalize model complexity, then the correct approach is to es-
timate the evidence directly (see, e.g., Friel and Wyse, 2012), rather than
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to approximate it by computing the fit and replacing the flexibility with the
BIC penalty, or some other simple approximation.
To elucidate, we consider submodels within a single model: everything in
the previous two sections also applies within a single model, on partitioning
the model’s parameters. The Gaussian linear model has d coefficients, de-
noted θ, but it also has two additional parameters σ and λ. So define the
evidence function
E(σ, λ) :=
∫
Θ
f(yobs; θ, σ) pi(θ;λ) dθ. (16)
Each tuple (σ, λ) defines a submodel, and the evidence function decomposes
as a fit term plus a flexibility term for each submodel:
E(σ, λ) = log f(yobs; θˆ, σ)− log pi
∗(θˆ;σ, λ)
pi(θˆ;λ)
(17)
remembering that θˆ is itself a function of (σ, λ). However, the BIC penalty
is invariant to the value of (σ, λ), and so if flexibility is approximated by the
BIC penalty then the only effect on the evidence of changing λ is indirectly
through its effect on θˆ in the fit term (this effect is itself indirect). But λ
controls the effective number of parameters, and to suppress its effect in this
way seems undesirable.
Put more generally, the O(1) term in the flexibility adjusts for the differ-
ence between the nominal and the effective number of parameters. Therefore,
approximating flexibility with the BIC penalty misses this crucial feature of
modern statistical models (Spiegelhalter et al., 2002).
We illustrate the O(1) discrepancy between flexibility and the BIC penalty
using the ‘donkeys’ dataset from Milner and Rougier (2014). The Gaussian
linear model is
log(weight) ∼ log(length) + log(girth) + gender, (18)
where gender is a factor with levels stallion, gelding, and female, rep-
resented by two dummy variables in the model matrix. The response is
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Figure 2: Flexibility and the BIC penalty for a set of submodels indexed by
(σ, λ), using the ‘donkeys’ dataset and the Gaussian linear model in (18).
centered, and the columns of the model matrix are centred and scaled, as is
sensible for a regularizer of the form given in (11a).
This application has n = 544 and d = 4, and is an excellent candidate
for a large-n approximation. Figure 2 shows the flexibility over a range
of moderate values for (σ, λ). Over this range, the difference between the
effective and the nominal number of parameters, crudely assessed, varies
from −1 to +4, which is sizable bearing in mind that (σ, λ) take moderate
values. This difference would be much larger if (σ, λ) were pushed to less
moderate values, which could easily happen in a numerical optimization.
5 Summary
The evidence of a model is a well-defined quantity, where by ‘model’ we mean
a statistical model plus a regularizer for the parameters or, equivalently, plus
a prior distribution for the parameters. The evidence can be challenging
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to evaluate, but this topic has been well-studied, and there are now many
options, covering a wide range of models. But what is the evidence for?
A Bayesian argument indidates that the evidence can be used to select
a single model according to posterior probability. A Frequentist argument
indicates that the evidence has the form of ‘fit minus complexity penalty’,
which makes the evidence an attractive optimand for an algorithm to select
a single model. We have taken the Frequentist argument to its conclusion,
identifying the unique decomposition of evidence into fit minus a term which
we label ‘flexibility’. We argue that flexibility behaves like a complexity
penalty, although any such argument has to be heuristic, given that model
complexity is such an amorphous concept.
We show that in the Gaussian linear model, and by extension in models
with Gaussian posterior distributions, the flexibility term equals the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC) penalty plus an O(1) term. But we caution
against using the approximation ‘flexibility ≈ BIC penalty’ for two reasons.
First, Gaussian posterior distributions are not a reliable feature of modern
practice in Statistics and Machine Learning. Second, the missing O(1) term
plays an important role in practice, capturing the difference between the
effective and the nominal number of parameters.
Adopting flexibility as the definition of model complexity unifies the
Bayesian and Frequentist justifications for selecting a single model on the
basis of the evidence. If flexibility is the right way to quantify and penalize
model complexity, then we strongly recommend estimating the evidence di-
rectly, rather than using ‘evidence = fit minus flexibility’ and then replacing
flexibility with a simpler term such as the BIC penalty.
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